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A major puzzle in the literature on social
preferences is that a large majority of subjects
behaves as if completely self-interested in some
circumstances, such as in competitive experi-
mental markets with standardized goods or in
the final rounds of public goods experiments;
while in other circumstances a large majority
behaves as if strongly motivated by fairness
concerns, e.g., in competitive markets with in-
complete contracts or in public goods experi-
ments with punishment opportunities. Recently
developed models of inequity aversion (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999; Gary E Bolton and Axel
Ockenfels, 2000) can explain this puzzle by
assuming a heterogeneous population of selfish
and inequity-averse subjects. Dirk Engelmann
and Martin Strobel (2004, henceforth E&S)
question the relevance of inequity aversion in
simple dictator game experiments, claiming that
a combination of a preference for efficiency1
and a Rawlsian motive for helping the least
well-off is more important than inequity
aversion.
In this paper, we show that E&S overstate the
relevance of efficiency motives and understate
the relevance of inequity aversion. The par-
ticipants of the E&S experiments were under-
graduate students of economics and business
administration. These subjects self-selected into
their field of study (economics) and learned in
the first semester that efficiency is desirable.
Noneconomists, however, may value efficiency
much less than economists do. We replicated
the most relevant E&S experiments with vari-
ous subject pools and are able to show that the
dominance of the efficiency motive over the
equity motive is restricted to students of eco-
nomics and business administration. Students
from various other disciplines and a sample of
nonacademic employees value equality much
more highly than efficiency.
This raises the question whether there are
other subject characteristics such as gender or
political attitudes that affect the preferences for
efficiency versus equality. We find a nonnegli-
gible gender effect, indicating that women are
more egalitarian than men. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, however, the dominance of equality over
efficiency is unrelated to political attitudes, i.e.,
subjects who vote for right-wing parties and
favor right-wing political attitudes are as likely
to favor equality as are subjects with left-wing
attitudes.
I. Economists versus Noneconomists
The most interesting results of E&S concern
their treatments Ey and P that are designed to
discriminate between preferences for efficiency,
the Rawlsian maximin motive, and inequity
aversion (see Table 1 below). In both treat-
ments, person 2 is the decision maker (dictator)
who can choose between allocations A, B, and
C. Note that own choices never affect person
2’s payoff. Person 2 can redistribute income
from a richer person 1 to a poorer person 3 in
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“Efficiency” in Engelmann and Strobel (2004) is not
defined as Pareto efficiency but as surplus maximization.
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both treatments by choosing allocations B or C
instead of allocation A. Choices B and C in-
volve a relatively high efficiency loss, however.
In treatment Ey, every additional money unit
that is given to the poor person reduces the rich
person’s income by four money units, while the
rich person suffers an income reduction of three
units if the poor person’s income is increased by
one unit in treatment P. In both treatments, a
choice of the efficient allocation A constitutes
evidence not only against specific functional
form assumptions (like piece-wise linearity or
positional asymmetry, meaning that subjects
prefer advantageous inequity to disadvanta-
geous inequity) in the Fehr-Schmidt approach,
but also against general nonlinear versions of
inequity aversion.2 Treatment P is particularly
important because the decision maker (person
2) always earns the lowest income, independent
of which allocation is implemented. Thus, the
decision cannot be affected by Rawlsian pref-
erences. Therefore, treatment P constitutes a
clean test of the relevance of inequity aversion
in comparison to the efficiency motive.
The E&S evidence for treatment P also illus-
trates an important point regarding the interpre-
tation of their results. E&S conclude that
“inequality aversion does not seem to be a ma-
jor part in a complete explanation” of their data.
This conclusion is based on their logit regres-
sions, which neglect any individual heterogene-
ity.3 One-third of their subjects choose the most
2 The inequity aversion approach by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) is compatible with the evidence in several other
games conducted by E&S (the “envy” games) if one allows
for nonlinear forms of inequity aversion and gives up the
assumption of positional asymmetry.
3 The conditional logit analysis in E&S is problematic
for two reasons. First, E&S can estimate the preferences
only of an “average subject,” which neglects any individual
heterogeneity. Second, the independent variables Eff (which
captures the sum of the subjects payoff), Self (which cap-
tures the decision maker’s own payoff), FS (which cap-
tures the disadvantageous inequality), and FS (which
captures advantageous inequality) are linearly dependent.
Thus, they have to exclude one or more of these variables
from the analysis. The decision which variable one should
exclude is, however, completely arbitrary, but has strong
effects on the regression outcomes. If, as E&S do, Self is
TABLE 1—SUBJECT POOL EFFECTS: ECONOMISTS VERSUS NONECONOMISTS
Allocation
Treatment Ey Treatment P
A B C A B C
Person 1 payoff 21 17 13 14 11 8
Person 2 payoff 9 9 9 4 4 4
Person 3 payoff 3 4 5 5 6 7
Total payoff 33 30 27 23 21 19
Average payoff of 1 and 3 12 10.5 9 9.5 8.5 7.5
Efficiency prediction A A
Inequity aversion prediction C C
Rawlsian maximin prediction C A or B or C
(A) Economists: Berlin (E&S, 2004)
Choices (absolute) 12 7 11 18 2 10
Choices (percent) 40.0 23.3 36.7 60.0 6.7 33.3
(B) Economists: Munich
Choices (absolute) 72 12 25 63 16 30
Choices (percent) 66.1 11.0 22.9 57.8 14.7 27.5
(C) Noneconomists: Munich
Choices (absolute) 22 13 48 21 17 45
Choices (percent) 26.5 15.7 57.8 25.3 20.5 54.2
(D) Noneconomists: Zurich
Choices (absolute) 8 8 20
Choices (percent) 22.2 22.2 55.6
(E) Economists: Zurich
Choices (absolute) 31 9 18 31 9 18
Choices (percent) 53.5 15.5 31.0 53.5 15.5 31.0
(F) Noneconomists: Zurich
Choices (absolute) 61 23 78 53 25 84
Choices (percent) 37.7 14.2 48.1 32.7 15.4 51.9
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inefficient and most egalitarian allocation in
treatment P, however, suggesting that they are
motivated by inequality aversion (see Table 1).
Perhaps the most important message that comes
from social preferences models is that in strate-
gic interactions the heterogeneity of social pref-
erences is extremely important. As shown in
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), even a minority of
inequality-averse subjects may have powerful
effects on the outcome of strategic interactions.
Thus, even if it were true that in general only
one-third of the population is motivated by in-
equality aversion, this motive can have impor-
tant effects. As we will see below, however,
among noneconomists, much more than one-
third of the subjects seem to be motivated by
inequality aversion.
In a first wave of paid experiment, we exam-
ined the subject pool hypothesis by conducting
the Ey and P treatments of E&S with two dif-
ferent subject pools from the University of Mu-
nich.4 The first subject pool consisted of 109
first-year undergraduate students in economics
and business administration (henceforth called
“economists”), while the second subject pool
was made up of 83 first- and second-year un-
dergraduates from other disciplines, mostly the
social sciences (henceforth called “nonecono-
mists”). Each subject had to make a decision in
both of the distribution games discussed above.
The results of these experiments are reported in
Table 1. For convenience, we also show the
results from the E&S experiments in panel A of
this table.
The subject pool effects displayed in Table 1
are striking. The Munich economics and busi-
ness administration students corroborate the
main E&S result, confirming that preferences
for efficiency play a major role among econo-
mists (compare panels A and B of Table 1);
66.1% of the economists opted for the efficient
but most inegalitarian allocation A in treatment
Ey, even exceeding the 40 percent in the E&S
study. The efficiency advantage of allocation A
is somewhat lower in game P and the fraction of
economists opting for the efficient allocation A
decreases slightly to 57.8 percent, very similar
to the E&S results. The behavior of nonecono-
mists from the University of Munich contrasts
sharply with these results, however (see panel C
of Table 1). In games Ey and P, the nonecono-
mists chose the inefficient but most egalitarian
allocation C at the rate of 57.8 percent and 54.2
percent, respectively, while only 25 to 27 per-
cent opted for the efficient allocation A. The
differences between the noneconomists and the
economists from the University of Munich are
statistically highly significant (p  0.001 in
each treatment, Fisher exact test).
An additional paid experiment with non-
economists (college students) in Zurich, Swit-
zerland, who participated only in treatment P,
further confirms the robustness of the subject
pool effect. A comparison of panels C and D of
Table 1 shows that these students’ choices were
almost identical to those of the noneconomists
from the University of Munich (p  0.93,
Fisher exact test). Only 22 percent choose the
efficient allocation A, while 55.6 percent choose
the allocation predicted by inequity aversion. The
choices of the noneconomists in Munich and Zu-
rich also differ significantly from the choices of
the E&S subjects (p  0.001, Fisher exact test),
further supporting a strong subject pool effect.
II. The Impact of Political Attitudes on Social
Preferences
The strong difference in behavior between
economists and noneconomists raises the ques-
tion of whether there are other subject pool
characteristics that might affect the results. Sub-
jects’ social preferences could be related to gen-
der, age, or their political attitudes. One might
conjecture that more right-wing subjects are less
in favor of equality and prefer more efficient
allocations than left-wing subjects. If this were
the case, or if other subject pool characteristics
had a significant impact, we would have to
worry about whether our subject pool is repre-
sentative with respect to these characteristics.
To address this concern, we conducted addi-
tional experiments where—after subjects had
made their choices in treatments Ey and P—we
excluded, FS and FS are not significant. If, however, FS
is excluded, Self and Eff are not significant. Thus, if one
takes their regression approach seriously, one could equally
well conclude that concerns for efficiency are irrelevant. To
make things worse, if one arbitrarily excludes Eff from the
analysis, Self and FS suddenly become highly significant.
We owe this argument to Mathias Erlei who respecified and
reestimated the E&S regressions.
4 In all experiments reported in this paper, subjects made
their decisions anonymously, they were paid in private, and
there was no role uncertainty, i.e., the decision makers knew
that they were in the role of person 2.
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collected information about their political atti-
tudes and how they voted in the last general
election. We also collected information about
their age, gender, and their membership in or-
ganizations (such as sports clubs or local char-
ities). We recruited 58 third-semester students
of economics or business administration from
the University of Zurich and 100 third-semester
students from other disciplines (law and medi-
cine) and an additional 62 noneconomists from
outside the university. These last subjects were
nonmanagement employees of banks and other
financial institutions. They had no college edu-
cation, but all of them had completed an ap-
prenticeship for their current job.
The subjects’ political preferences were elic-
ited in two ways. First, subjects ranked them-
selves on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates
the most extreme left-wing position and 10 in-
dicates the most extreme right-wing position.
This self-report measure of political attitudes is
now widely used in representative surveys in
Switzerland. In addition, we asked subjects how
they voted in the last national election. Both
economists and noneconomists participated in
these elections at a rate of approximately 70
percent. For these subjects, we computed a
Spearman rank correlation between their self-
reported political attitudes on the 0–10 scale
and their votes for left, center, and right par-
ties.5 This correlation is 0.78 (p  0.001), in-
dicating that subjects’ ranking on the left-right
scale and their actual voting behavior are
consistent.
The results of our new experiments are
displayed in panels E and F of Table 1 and in
Table 2. We first tested for differences between
5 In these calculations, we treat the social democrats and
the green party as left-wing parties, the liberal party (FDP),
the Christian democrats (CVP), and the Evangelical peo-
ple’s party (EVP) as center parties, and the Swiss people’s
party (SVP) as a right-wing party. This classification is also
used by political scientists.
TABLE 2—IMPACT OF SUBJECT POOL, POLITICAL ATTITUDE, AND GENDER
Independent variables
Dependent variable: Choices in the distribution game
(0  allocation A, 1  allocation B, 2  allocation C)
New data
(panel E and F in Table 1)
All data
(panels B to F in Table 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ey P Ey&P Ey P Ey&P
Dummy for economist
(1  economist)
0.159** 0.207*** 0.183*** 0.258*** 0.242*** 0.250***
(0.070) (0.069) (0.060) (0.043) (0.043) (0.037)
Gender dummy
(1  women)
0.067 0.125* 0.095* 0.091* 0.086* 0.088**
(0.066) (0.066) (0.058) (0.048) (0.045) (0.039)
Political attitude
(0  left, 10  right)
0.015 0.003 0.009
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
Age 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Dummy for membership
in organizations
0.073 0.105 0.089
(0.068) (0.069) (0.059)
Dummy for Ey-treatment 0.034 0.040
(0.034) (0.025)
Pr (C) if a noneconomist 0.482 0.521 0.501 0.513 0.530 0.521
Number of observations 216 216 432 407 443 850
Cluster per subjects no no yes no no yes
Prob  chi2 0.103 0.008 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.036 0.028 0.047 0.039 0.044
Notes: The table reports the marginal effects of the different variables on choosing the egalitarian allocation C. Numbers in
parentheses denote the standard error of the marginal effects. The marginal effects are evaluated at the point where the dummy
for economists is set at zero. The estimated baseline probability of choosing allocation C for noneconomists is given in the
row “Pr(C) if a noneconomist.”
* Indicates the coefficient is statistically different from zero above the 0.1 significance level.
** Indicates the coefficient is statistically different from zero above the 0.05 significance level.
*** Indicates the coefficient is statistically different from zero above the 0.01 significance level.
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students from noneconomic disciplines and em-
ployees. It turns out that the behavior of these
two groups is very similar, which is confirmed
by statistical tests (p  0.775 in the Ey treat-
ment, p 0.739 in the P treatment, Fisher exact
test). Therefore, we pooled their data in panel F
of Table 1. The table shows that both in treat-
ment Ey and P, 53.5 percent of the economists
prefer the efficient allocation A, whereas only
31 percent preferred the egalitarian allocation C
(see panel E of the table). This pattern is re-
versed, however, among the noneconomists
(panel F of Table 1). A majority of nonecono-
mists (51.9 percent) prefers the most egalitarian
allocation C and only 32.7 percent choose the
efficient allocation A in treatment P. Similarly,
a relative majority of the noneconomists (48.1
percent) prefers allocation C in treatment Ey
and only 37.7 percent choose the efficient allo-
cation A.
The differences between economists and
noneconomists in self-reported political atti-
tudes are small. On average, economists score
5.28 on the left-right scale, whereas the non-
economists are somewhat more left wing and
score 4.95. This difference is statistically insig-
nificant (p  0.41, Mann Whitney test). There
is, however, strong individual variation in both
groups. It is therefore interesting to examine
whether individual differences in political atti-
tude can explain the individual variation in so-
cial preferences across subjects.
In Table 2, we report the marginal effects
of ordered probit regressions where the
choice of the most unequal allocation A is
represented with 0, allocation B with 1, and
the egalitarian allocation C with 2. As explan-
atory variables, we included a dummy vari-
able for economists (1 for economist), a
gender dummy (1 for women), the political
attitude on the left-right scale, age, and a
dummy for whether the subject is a member
in an organization or club. Regression (1) is
based on data from the Ey treatment and
regression (2) uses the data from the P treat-
ment. We pool the data from both treatments
in regression (3) and control for the potential
dependence of subjects’ decisions across
treatments by clustering on subjects. We also
control for a treatment effect in regression (3)
by including a dummy for the Ey treatment.
The most important fact stemming from the
first three regressions reported in Table 2 is that
the marginal effect for the economists’ dummy
is negative and highly significant, even after
controlling for political attitudes. In fact, while
political attitude has virtually no effect on social
preferences, regression (3) shows economists
have an 18-percentage-point lower probability
of choosing the egalitarian allocation C. Age,
membership in organizations, and the Ey-
dummy have no significant effects. The gender
variable is weakly significant, however, and indi-
cates that women are somewhat more egalitarian.
If we average over both treatments (i.e., take re-
gression 3), women are roughly 10 percent more
likely to choose the egalitarian allocation C.
We pooled all data from our experiments in
regressions 4 to 6 to estimate the overall impact
of the economists’ dummy and a gender dummy
on social preferences.6 The results of these
regressions indicate that economists are 25
percentage points less likely to choose the
egalitarian allocation C, while women are more
likely to choose C by 9 percentage points. Note,
also, that if we pool the data from both treat-
ments (regression 6) the gender dummy is sig-
nificant at the 5-percent level.
III. Conclusions
Our experiments indicate that there is a
strong subject pool effect in the simple distri-
bution games of Engelmann and Strobel (2004).
While a majority of economists prefer effi-
ciency over equity, various groups of nonecono-
mists, ranging from students of various other
disciplines to low-level employees of banks and
financial institutions, show the opposite pattern.
On average, more than 50 percent of the non-
economists prefer the most egalitarian (and least
efficient) distribution, while the probability of
an economist choosing this allocation is 25 per-
centage points lower. Thus, we conclude that
preferences for equity are of major importance
in simple distribution experiments, even though
there is a significant minority of subjects who
seem to be concerned about efficiency. We have
also shown that subjects’ political preferences
do not affect their social preferences for effi-
6 We took all data reported in panels B to F in Table 1.
Since we do not have values for age, political attitude, and
membership in organizations in the experiments reported in
panels B to D, we cannot use these variables in the regres-
sions 4 to 6.
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ciency and equity. Subjects with a right-wing
political attitude are as likely to choose the
egalitarian allocation as left-wing subjects.
Women, however, favor the egalitarian alloca-
tion more often than men do.
The relative importance of the different moti-
vational forces seems to differ not only across
subject pools but also across games. The E&S
experiments all involve dictator games without
strategic interaction. Efficiency concerns are an
important motivational force for a significant frac-
tion of the subjects in these nonstrategic distribu-
tion games, but they seem to be far less important
in strategic games such as bargaining, trust, or
public good games. The ultimatum game is a
striking case in point. Efficiency requires that the
responder accept any positive offer. There is a
huge amount of experimental evidence, however,
showing that low offers are frequently rejected.
Inequity aversion does a much better job of pre-
dicting behavior in these latter games, and it is
consistent with the choices of a large fraction
of the subjects in the E&S distribution games.
A better understanding of the functioning of
different motivational forces in different en-
vironments is an important question for future
research.
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